The problems that Kashmir poses to the center can be described best as an insurgency issue. The Kashmir valley has become a hot- bed of separatist activity, where ISI sponsored extremists can often find safety in numbers and where the public are often willing to give them sanctuary.
Counter- insurgency operations require rapid response times and more than an adequate amount of secrecy to accomplish successfully. This is the case that is often times made by many security agencies when certain breaches of ethical codes come to light (read: the CIA), but that still leaves the question of how much rope agencies can be given in situations, if they ever can be, in the name of safety.
The complexity of the operations in the valley, where claims differ as to the exact number of separatist organizations and militants that are active at any given time, can be best understood by using the case study of the operations of the United States in Afghanistan. While Iraq was a little more cut and dried in terms of operational complexity, Afghanistan was a mezzanine of differing control nodes and cross- cutting linkages, which made fighting both the Taliban and Al- Qaeda threat increasingly difficult. Another take away from that operation (if it can even be called that) is that the longer the United States and its NATO allies stayed put, the more local resistance they encounter.
The Valley too poses the same kind of threat to the Indian Army. Being a Muslim dominated region, there is opposition to a mostly Hindu, peace keeping force, who have not done much to earn the trust of the locals. It must be remembered here that counter- insurgency is often territory where huge errors in judgement can be made since the stakes are high.
Counter- insurgency operations require rapid response times and more than an adequate amount of secrecy to accomplish successfully. This is the case that is often times made by many security agencies when certain breaches of ethical codes come to light (read: the CIA), but that still leaves the question of how much rope agencies can be given in situations, if they ever can be, in the name of safety.
The complexity of the operations in the valley, where claims differ as to the exact number of separatist organizations and militants that are active at any given time, can be best understood by using the case study of the operations of the United States in Afghanistan. While Iraq was a little more cut and dried in terms of operational complexity, Afghanistan was a mezzanine of differing control nodes and cross- cutting linkages, which made fighting both the Taliban and Al- Qaeda threat increasingly difficult. Another take away from that operation (if it can even be called that) is that the longer the United States and its NATO allies stayed put, the more local resistance they encounter.
The Valley too poses the same kind of threat to the Indian Army. Being a Muslim dominated region, there is opposition to a mostly Hindu, peace keeping force, who have not done much to earn the trust of the locals. It must be remembered here that counter- insurgency is often territory where huge errors in judgement can be made since the stakes are high.
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